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Quick Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter introduces a six-element self framework that includes I/me-selves, meta-self, 
Not-I/me-selves and united self. Extant research illustrates how giving can be increased by 
about 10% by focusing on only one or two I/me-selves at a time. I will argue that more 
substantive uplifts may be possible by tapping into other elements of my model. I provide 
examples of how fundraisers can utilize the conflict management function of the meta-self, 
so, for example, it is possible that Mothers Against Drunk Driving can raise more money if 
they tap into how mothers who lost a child to a drunk driver can transition from a victim I-
self to a conqueror I-self. This is a meta-self function because for quite a few months mothers 
may struggle to decide which I-self they should give dominion to when deciding how to live 
their lives (i.e. I-Self conflict management). Such a message also has the potential to help 
these mothers feel better faster than messages that tap into only one I-self at a time. I also 
give examples of how fundraisers can tap into donors’ united self, whose function is to derive 
the most harmonious self that includes both I/me-selves and Not-I/me-selves. For example, 
supporters of Amnesty International may give because they care for those who human rights 
are abused (e.g. their loving I-self) and because they have No-tolerance for such abuse (e.g. 
their loving Not-I-self). The harmony the united self drives is one in which Amnesty 
supporters fight for as long as necessary to care for (and express their love for) the abused. 
United self balances the loving I-self and the loving Not-I-self. Hyper-personalizing 
fundraising communications under the guidance of the six-component self-framework, I 
argue can transform the quality of relationship that donors have with charities and the degree 
to which giving can transform lives. 
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Abstract 
 
Data from the Giving USA Foundation (2016) shows that individuals gave about $9.66 
billion in 2015. This is only about 2% of GDP. It has not grown for 50 years since the record 
at Giving USA began. This chapter asks how a better understanding of identity relevance can 
be used to drive up and sustain charitable giving without detracting from how good people 
feel about their support. I do so by proposing a six-element self that includes the I/me-self, 
the meta-self, the not-I/me-self and the united self. I will explore how they shape donors’ 
sense of who they are, how they motivate giving, how giving can shape the adaptation and 
development of donors’ sense of self and how they together can increase psychological well-
being (Ryff, 1995; Ryff and Singer, 2008).  
 
Key terms: Identity, Self, meta-self, united self, charitable giving, psychological well-being  
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Introduction 
 
The United Nation’s 2030 agenda was developed to solve some of the most significant social 
problems facing our global community today (e.g. ending poverty and hunger, producing 
clean water and sanitation for all, or reducing inequalities) (United Nations, 2015). Charities 
play a significant role in delivering some of these ambitions. The degree to which charities 
can succeed however is very often correlated with how successfully fundraisers can raise 
charitable donations. This chapter explores the possibility that identity-based motivation can 
contribute to the success of fundraising and hence the social missions (Reed et al, 2012; 
Oyserman, 2009).  
 
Field experiments routinely show that identity relevant manipulations can increase charitable 
giving by a minimum of 10% when they reinforce Christian identity (Shang and Sargeant, 
2018), moral identity (Shang, Reed, Sargeant, & Carpenter, 2019) or organizational identity 
(Kong, 2018). At the same time, identity motivated giving is shown to change donors’ sense 
of who they are (i.e. identity) and how they prioritize the descriptors they use to define 
themselves (Shang and Sargeant, 2018). Giving can also uplift and encourage people in a way 
that shrinks the gap between how moral they think they actually are and how moral they 
ideally would like to be (i.e. giving shrinks moral identity discrepancy) (Shang, et al., 2019).  
 
These results suggest that identity and its associated identity processes (e.g. adoption, 
definition and redefinition, continuous adaption2 and expulsion) have the potential to change 
                                                          
2 Adoption is defined as “the process of bringing a new identity into the self-schema”, 
definition and redefinition is the process of assigning meaning to a new identity, continuous 
adaption includes four identity processes: reinforcement (“the process of strengthening an 
identity over time when this identity functions in a single identity maintenance system, i.e. 
the increase or decrease in its strength is not related to that of any other identities”), dilution 
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giving and vice versa (Reed and Forehand, 2016). The identity relevance principle in Reed et 
al’s 2012 theory suggests that the degree to which identity and identity processes influence 
giving and the degree to which giving influences identity and its processes may be partially 
determined by how relevant they are to each other: “When identity information is 
deliberatively processed, its influence will be greatest on stimuli that possess object 
relevance, symbolic relevance, goal relevance, action relevance or evaluation relevance to 
the identity” (P.316, Reed et al. 2012). My own research shows the more relevant identities 
and their processes are to giving, the more likely identity-motivated giving can enhance 
donors’ psychological well-being (Shang and Sargeant, 2018).  
 
I introduce a six-self framework that builds on Reed et al’s 2012 identity-based motivation 
framework by differentiating six types of the self (i.e. the me-self/not-me-self, the I-self/not-
I-self, the meta-self and the united self) (i.e. self, Erikson, 1959; Erikson & Erikson, 1998). It 
also builds on Reed and Forehand’s 2016 framework by explicitly differentiating the process 
of self-association from self-dissociation and self-never-association, and the process of 
identity definition and re-definition (i.e. how people define the identities when they adopt a 
category label as one of their identities and how people re-define it afterwards) from other 
identity processes (e.g. adoption, reinforcement, dilution, elevation, suppression and 
expulsion). Figure 1 summarizes all the components of this framework. All regular fonts are 
original labels borrowed from Reed and Forehand’s framework. Some definitions of these 
original labels are amended in light of the six-self framework. All bold fonts are new labels. I 
will introduce the content in this framework sequentially. 
                                                          
(“the process of weakening an identity over time”), elevation (“the process of increasing the 
prominence of a given identity within a hierarchy of identities”) and suppression (“the 
process of reducing the prominence of a given identity within a hierarchy of identities. And 
expulsion is defined as “the process of dispossession of an existing identity”) (P. 94-95, Reed 
and Forehand, 2016). 
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I will first define the three elements of the self that have been studied in the past (Me-Self, I-
Self and Meta-Self) and what fundraisers can do with them. Then, I will explain why I think 
understanding the Not-Me-Self, Not-I-Self and the United Self can be useful, why the six-
elements together have the potential to drive behavioural change in a way that has the highest 
sustainability, and why behavioural change (e.g. giving) when sustained this way, has the 
highest chance of maximizing donors’ psychological well-being (Ryff, 1995; Ryff & Singer, 
2008).  
 
Psychological well-being in our context is defined as donors feel 1) their donations can make 
a meaningful difference in their mastery of the world (competence), 2) they have made the 
donation decision autonomously based on what is meaningful to them, not what is 
meaningful to most others (autonomy), 3) their donation decision connects them to others 
important to them (relatedness), 4) their giving experience allows them to grow their sense of 
who they are (growth), 5) their giving experience allows them to clarify and move forward 
their purpose in life (purpose in life) and 5) they experience a sense of holistic self-
acceptance of who they are through giving (self-acceptance). 
 
I hope a better understanding of these processes by fundraisers can help reverse declines both 
in the donor population and the longevity of typical donor relationships.  A British donor, for 
example, only stays supporting an organisation for 4.2 years (Sargeant, 2018) and 70% of 
newly acquired American donors will not renew their support into a second year (Sargeant & 
Jay, 2014). 
 
The Six-Self Framework 
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Reed and colleagues (Reed et al, 2012) made an important contribution to the literature in 
identity and consumer behaviour by providing a parsimonious definition of identity.  
 
“Identity is defined as any category label to which a consumer self-associates 
that is amenable to a clear picture of what the person in the category looks 
like, thinks, feels and does” (P. 310) 
 
Examples of identities in Reed and colleagues’ (2012)3 include: 
 
“objective membership groups (e.g., gender or family, as discussed in Epp & 
Price, 2008), culturally determined membership groups (e.g., ethnicity and 
religion, as discussed in Dong & Tian, 2009), abstracted role ideals (e.g., 
mother, friend, philanthropist), groups premised on association with a known 
individual (e.g., a graduate advisor), with an individual who is not known 
personally (e.g., Tiger Woods), or with dimensions of self that are indexed by 
an imagined other (Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Ethier,1995). Although there are 
many types of identities (as described above), it should be noted that a single 
identity term can bridge various classifications. For example, the term 
“mother” can refer simultaneously to a person's status as a member of an 
objective group or as an abstracted role ideal, and it is premised on an 
association with a known individual (i.e., the focal person's child or 
children).” 
 
                                                          
3 For a complete list of the identities included please see Figure 3 in Reed et al (2012).   
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Self, which is defined as self-schemas, can encompass multiple identities (Reed, 2004; Reed 
et al, 2012) “whether objective and relatively stable (e.g. father, son, millennial, Hispanic, 
etc.) or transitory and fluid (e.g. Apple user, Democrat, lawyer, athlete, etc)” P. 94 (Reed and 
Forehand, 2016). The solid lines around Figure 1 shows that the environment that we live in 
can be seen as waves of feelings, thoughts and actions that can form a range of clear pictures 
of category labels. The black dotted rectangular marks outline the territory traditionally 
included in the research of self-schemas. 
 
Me-Self and I-Self 
 
In order for any environmentally available category labels or definitions to enter into the 
traditionally defined self-schemas, they must be adopted. That is clear pictures must be 
unconsciously (me-self in Example (1)) or consciously (I-self in Example (2-5)) associated to 
the self.  
 
Me-self refers to the self/selves in which category labels are adopted 
unconsciously (i.e. self-associated) and processed bottom-up. 
 
For example, an angry mother who has just lost her child in a car accident involving a 
drunk driver, can look like an angry mother, think like an angry mother, feel like an 
angry mother and behave like an angry mother, yet never associate herself with an 
angry mother label or consciously define what being an angry mother means to her 
(Example 1 in Figure 1). This angry mother me-self can be reinforced, elevated, diluted, 
supressed or expulsed without any top-down process to accelerate or impede what 
occurs in the neuro-system bottom up (Kühnen, Hannover and Schubert, 2001).  
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I-self refers to the self/selves in which category labels are adopted (i.e. self-associated) 
consciously and processed top-down (Voyer and Franks, 2014; McAdams, 2013).  
 
This perspective applies when an angry mother consciously associates herself with the angry 
mother label and recognized that she looks, thinks, feels and behaves like an angry mother. 
When this self-association is consciously accepted, she can top-down define what it means. 
One definition could be that I have become a victim of my own anger (Example 2 in Figure 
1). She can then top-down accelerate or impede any of the processes (i.e. reinforcement, 
elevation, dilution, suppression or expulsion) in the me-self that would otherwise occur in 
only a bottom-up fashion. Our me-selves and I-selves together match Reed and colleagues’ 
definition of identity, because they both exist as self-associations with category labels. Table 
1 summarizes the differences between Me-Self and I-self.   
 
 Self-Association 
with Category 
Labels 
(Adoption) 
The Processing of these Category 
Labels (i.e. reinforcement, 
elevation, dilution, suppression 
and expulsion) 
Are these labels 
consciously 
defined for the 
individual? 
Me-Self Unconscious bottom-up No 
I-Self Conscious top-down Yes 
    
Table 1: The Differences between Me-Self and I-Self 
 
When some of these me-selves are top-down influenced by I-selves through shared labels 
(example 4 in Figure 1), definitions (example 3) or both (example 2), I-selves can top-down 
accelerate or impede the bottom-up processes. For example, when I-self and me-self 
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(example 1) share the same definition with the same (example 2) or a different label (example 
3)), I-self can top-down accelerate the elevation of the me-self. The I-self can choose to 
ruminate on the thoughts that “I felt angry”, relive events where anger has been expressed 
and rehearse the association that I am a victim of my own anger (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979). This rumination can continue long after the occurrence of the trigger event and 
it reinforces the me-self in a way that is much stronger than what is possible with a bottom-up 
process alone (Andrews & Anderson Thompson, 2009).  
 
As another example, when I-self and me-self share only the labels but not the definitions 
(comparison between example 1 and 4 in Figure 1), I-self can top-down impede (not 
accelerate) elevation. For example, as the mother begins to feel angry and shouts at her 
surviving family, her I-self can step in and rehearse the thought that “I can conquer of my 
anger”. This thought can help the person recognize that she may have failed this time, but she 
does not have to ruminate on the ideas or dwell in her failures. Instead, she can choose to 
apologize. In initiating the apology, her I-self top-down impeded the elevation that the angry 
me-self would otherwise receive bottom-up. When I-self and me-self share neither the labels 
nor the definitions (comparison between example 5 and 1), the top-down and bottom-up 
processes are least likely to interface with each other. 
 
Processes like adoption, reinforcement, dilution, elevation, suppression and expulsion can 
occur as a combination of bottom-up and top-down processes. When only a me-self exists in 
isolation in the memory (i.e. they are not connected to any other me-selves or I-selves in 
memory, e.g. one’s gambling me-self may be an isolated self that has no association to any 
other parts of one’s life) in the self-schemas, bottom-up reinforcement and dilution determine 
whether a given me-self can become available in working memory to influence our looks, 
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feelings, thoughts and behaviours. When multiple me-selves exist in the memory of self-
schemas without any top-down influence exerted by the I-selves, bottom-up elevation and 
suppression processes insure that the most salient, important and relevant me-self will come 
into working memory (Anderson, Bothell, , Byrne, Douglass, Lebiere, & Qin, 2004) ; Reed 
and Forehand, 2016). When me-selves and I-selves are connected, bottom-up and top-down 
processes jointly determine whether they are adopted (+), reinforced (+), elevated (+) or 
diluted (-), suppressed (-) and expulsed (-). The (+) and (-) signs in Figure 1 shows whether 
the overall strength of association increased or decreased as a result of these processes.  
 
Meta-Self 
 
The Meta-self refers to the self that consciously manages the conflicts between two or 
more I-selves that may be in competition with each other for resources like attention, 
mental processing capacities or actions. (Bahl and Milne, 2010).  
 
Figure 1 marks the territory of meta-self: all possible I-selves. As some examples, this could 
include one’s actual self, ideal self  (Higgins, 1987), moral self (Acuino and Reed), authentic 
self (Johnson, Robinson and Mitchell, 2004), true self (Schelegel et al, 2009; 2011), 
redemptive self (Guo, Klevan and MacAdamsn, 2016), extended self (Belk, 1988), collective 
self (Brewer and Gardner, 1996), social self (Brewer and Pierce 2005), and fused self (Swann 
et al 2012). Whatever label that the self chooses to consciously associate themselves with and 
whatever definition they choose to employ. 
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The content of Meta-self is not only the two or more category associations adopted and 
defined by I-selves, but also how they are in conflict and the momentary hierarchies of these 
I-selves. By definition, we assume that people can experience only one meta-self at any given 
moment, although the content of the meta-self can change continuously. Meta-self does not 
influence me-selves unless it is through I-selves. All (+) and (-) signs as shown in Figure 1 
hence can be combinations of bottom-up processes associated with me-selves and top-down 
processes associated with both I-selves and meta-selves.  
 
At any given moment, the meta-self maximizes cohesion and minimizes conflicts between I-
selves. In doing so, it maximizes the individual’s social functions (McAdams, 2013; Bahl and 
Milne, 2010) and psychological well-being (Ryff1995; Ryff & Singer, 2008). When conflicts 
cannot be resolved, meta-self establishes dominate I-self through the conscious elevation, 
suppression and expulsion of I-selves.  
 
We will use the relationship between donors and an organization called Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving (MADD) to clarify what meta-self is and what function it plays. MADD’s 
mission is to “end drunk driving, help fight drugged driving, support the victims of these 
violent crimes and prevent underage drinking” (MADD, n.d.). Many MADD supporters have 
lost their loved ones in car accident involving impaired driving. They joined MADD to 
reduce such deaths to zero. 
 
A mother for example may have lost her 2-year-old son about a month ago and joined 
MADD immediately after that. One month after this trauma, she may consciously self-
associate with both an angry mother category label which is defined as the victim of one’s 
anger (example 2) and a MADD mother category label which is defined as the conqueror of 
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one’s anger (example 5). Whenever she feels angry and is about to blow up at the smallest 
irritation her surviving 5-year daughter creates, her meta-self chooses which I-self to give 
dominion: the victim who will express anger or the conqueror who will turn on her favourite 
music and calm herself down before she reacts. This is how meta-self works when there is no 
overlap between the I-selves in labels or in definitions (as in the case of example 2 and 5).  
 
When there is overlap between the multiple I-selves, bottom-up processes may also resolve 
conflicts unconsciously, joining the meta-self’s top-down processes. For example, when a 
mother first joined MADD, she may define herself as a victim of her own anger. But she is 
not sure whether that definition is most appropriately paired with an angry mother label 
(example 2) or a MADD supporter label (example 3). Both I-selves hence may exist for a few 
months as she figures it out. For as long as the two labels share the same definition, the two I-
selves and their associated me-selves (the me-self that shares the same label, the same 
definition or both with the I-selves) may interface with each other in bottom-up and top-down 
processes. The result of these processes is that these selves may end up with varying degrees 
of dispositional centrality, situational salience and relevance in determining how the person 
feels, thinks and acts (Reed et al, 2012; Reed and Forehand, 2016). Meta-self only top-down 
accelerates or impedes I-self related processes, and then I-selves can top-down accelerate or 
impede me-self related processes. 
 
How can fundraisers utilize this knowledge to increase fundraising success?  
 
Me-Self and Giving 
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Fundraisers can first map out the most relevant self-transitioning journeys that their potential 
and existing donors may go through when they make decisions about supporting or remaining 
with the organization. For example a mother, after losing a child to drunk driving, can 
unconsciously self-associate with an angry mother identity (Example 1). Because this is a 
new set of feelings, thoughts, and actions that emerged after her child’s death, her me-self 
probably unconsciously adopts the category label of an angry mother without necessarily her 
I-self consciously recognizing the clear picture or the association during the few months after 
the death.  
 
This angry mother me-self can be unconsciously reinforced (i.e. it is strengthened in memory 
but no other me-selves are strengthened or weakened) or elevated (i.e. it is strengthened in 
memory and other opposing me-selves weakened) every time she expresses anger and feels 
comforted afterwards, or unconsciously diluted (i.e. it is weakened but no other me-selves are 
strengthened) or suppressed (i.e. it is weakened while other me-selves are strengthened) every 
time expressing anger does not lead to any desirable consequences (Reed and Forehand, 
2016; Anderson, et. Al 2008). A vast literature shows that the me-self and its associated 
unconscious processes can influence behaviour (e.g. giving) and vice versa (McAdams, 2013; 
Reed et al, 2012).  
 
Tapping into the knowledge on the me-self, fundraisers can grow giving by growing me-
self’s situational salience, dispositional importance and relevance to the decision at hand 
(Reed & Foreman, 2016). An advertisement slogan for example can be designed to prime the 
feelings and the behavioural patterns of the angry mother identity me-self without calling out 
the category label: “Feeling like screaming in anger? You are not alone! Join 500 other 
mothers who lost their sons and daughters for a night of sharing this weekend.”  
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Before a donor consciously associates herself with a relevant category label or consciously 
defines what that label means to her, we hypothesize that this advertisement will be more 
effective if it taps into the unconscious looks, feelings (e.g. “Are you feeling angry most of 
the time?”), thoughts (e.g. “Are you at a loss as to how to cope with losing a child to drunk 
driving?”) and behaviours, without highlighting the category label. This is because doing so 
may either appear irrelevant, or even false to them. It may put them off because they may 
consciously think “I am not an angry mother. I am not a victim of my own anger.” 
 
Fundraisers should not feel bad about utilizing these techniques in attracting potential donors, 
especially during the time when some of them are going through probably the worst trauma 
in their lives. This is because they understand the value their network can offer for these 
mothers. For example, after attending the first few MADD events, the bottom-up process may 
allow these mothers to unconsciously associate with a MADD supporter me-self that feels, 
thinks and behaves more like a conqueror than a victim (this me-self is not marked in Figure 
1 due to space constraint). They accomplish this unconscious me-self transition by mimicking 
what other MADD mothers do. This transition through mimicry can be hugely beneficial for 
these mothers and increase their psychological well-being (Hill, Summer, & Burrow, 2014). 
 
I-Self and Giving 
 
Until when a mother consciously recognizes the difference between the definitions of the two 
labels, a top-down process from the MADD-mother-conqueror I-self cannot exert any top-
down influence into the bottom-up process to elevate the corresponding me-self. Fundraisers’ 
job hence is to detect as soon as possible when that unconscious transition occurs, and help 
the conscious adoption of the new MADD label and MADD definition as soon as they think 
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the new me-self is ready. So that the new I-self can help speed up the helpful transition 
process. 
 
If fundraisers can map out the typical trajectory and timeline of how these types of self-
transitions occur for their donors, they can care for their needs and deepen their connection 
with the organization more effectively (Shang et al.,2019).  For example, fundraising 
communications can have an outer envelope for a fundraising event invitation to say: “You 
have done it! You have beaten Anger. Now, let’s live in a MADD way! Open the invitation 
and find out how!”  
 
We hypothesize that this headline should have a higher open rate than any other headlines 
that make salient only one self in isolation at a time (e.g. Are you angry? Are you a victim of 
anger? Have you won your battle against anger? Are you living in a MADD way?). This is 
because it captures the transition process that occurred, not only the starting or the ending 
point of the transition. It has the potential to make people feel understood and cared for 
(Nelson, 2019). If these transitions only just occur unconsciously as me-self transitions, we 
hypothesize, the success of this type of headline can be higher as measured as the facilitation 
of conscious I-self transitions. If these transitions occur consciously as I-self transitions, we 
hypothesize, the success of this type of headline can be even higher as measured as response 
rate to the mailing. 
 
Given that, fundraisers should also be aware that the conscious adoption of a category label 
(i.e. the adoption of an I-self) does not automatically or immediately expulse the angry 
mother me-self or terminate any me-self related processes (e.g. reinforcement, elevation, 
dilution or suppression). It does however have the potential to accelerate or impede processes 
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that are only bottom-up. For example, people’s MADD-supporter I-Self (defined as a 
conqueror) can choose to go to MADD gatherings even when their angry-mother me-self 
(defined as a victim) does not feel like attending.  
 
In doing so, they may meet others and learn how MADD supporters differ from angry 
mothers. Every time when they feel angry, it is more likely that they know they can conquer 
it, and it is more likely that they behave differently. This means even though the feeling can 
still unconsciously trigger their angry-mother me-self as a victim, the thoughts and the 
behaviours that follow can be more and more often based on the definition of who a MADD-
supporter is as a conqueror. If the behaviour is carried out, the MADD-supporter I-self is 
elevated whereas the angry-mother me-self is suppressed. This elevation and suppression 
process may be conscious at the time of the person fighting between behavioural options in 
her own head but can become unconscious as such reflection becomes more automatic and 
takes less conscious reflection. Neither requires the involvement of the meta-self, because it 
is a fight between a me-self and an I-self, not two or more I-selves. 
 
The ultimate benefit we think for fundraisers to use fundraising communications to empower 
their donors with this kind reflection on their self-transition, is not only that they can more 
sustainably raise funds for their social causes. Rather, they ensure that their donors do so for 
the right reason by growing the relevance of their causes to their donors’ sense of who they 
are. That is they grow the kind of giving that is motivated by the right I-selves. And it is 
almost by definition that this kind of giving is more reflective of the personal goals, values 
and desires (McAdams, 2013; Frankl, 1985). It can increase their sense of competence in 
mastering their environment (e.g. by consciously identifying more effective coping 
mechanisms through interacting with other MADD supporters), attaining a higher degree of 
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autonomy (i.e. by adopting definitions that are most meaningful to the individual) and having 
a better sense of personal growth (e.g. as the most meaningful I-selves are consciously 
reinforced and elevated and the least meaningful me-selves consciously or unconsciously 
diluted and suppressed (Ryff, 1995, Ryff and Singer, 2008)).  
 
Meta-Self and Giving 
 
Up to this point of the unconscious adoption of a new MADD-supporter me-self as a 
conqueror and a conscious adoption of a new MADD-supporter I-self as a conqueror, the 
meta-self has not exerted any top-down influence other than continuously monitoring 
whether any new I-selves may have been adopted. This is because any new I-self adopted 
may pose the potential for conflict that it may be required to manage. 
 
When the meta-self detects that a MADD-supporter I-self defined as a conqueror (example 5) 
is adopted, it begins to monitor how that may conflict with the MADD-supporter I-self 
defined as a victim (example 3).  If the meta-self determines that the conqueror definition 
allows the mother to experience higher psychological well-being, then it can accelerate the 
elevation of the MADD-supporter I-self defined as a conqueror (example 5) and the 
suppression and expulsion of the MADD-supporter I-self defined as a victim (example 3). 
The meta-self does so by giving dominion to the former whenever possible (e.g. allowing the 
MADD-supporter I-self to determine whether and how often to attend MADD meetings and 
how she reacts to minor irritations despite what the angry-mother I-self might feel, think or 
attempt to behave).  
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In order to effectively use this knowledge, fundraisers will have to again assess when typical 
donors of theirs might be struggling with this kind of choice. Once detected, they can design 
more targeted digital communications to help them cope better and give more sustainably. 
For example, fundraisers can relate to the frustration and tiredness that some of the mothers 
might experience (i.e. their meta-self constantly battling and choosing between two I-selves) 
by sharing social media advice: “Tired of choosing between winning or losing your battle 
against anger? MADD supporters have five tips that they can share with you.” 
 
In doing so, fundraisers have also taken the concept of “identity relevance” to a more 
nuanced level. It is no longer only about being relevant to any one self in isolation. 
Fundraisers can make giving decisions relevant to facilitate the kind of me-self, I-self and 
meta-self transitions that donors may go through in order to achieve better psychological 
functioning. When applying the identity relevance principle as an amateur, fundraisers may 
tap into only one relevant identity at a time (i.e. an angry mother however defined) along one 
dimension at a time (i.e. object relevance, symbolic relevance, goal relevance, action 
relevance, or evaluation relevance). But once fundraisers differentiate me-self, I-self and 
meta-self, identity relevance can be used in a more subtle way to facilitate me-self and I-self 
transitioning and meta-self functioning. 
 
Not-I-Self, Not-Me-Self and United Self 
 
What is shared by me-self and I-self is that a self-association between a category label and 
the self must occur. What remains unaccounted for however is what happens to the category 
labels that are consciously dis-associated (e.g. I can never be someone who drives the same 
kind of car as the one that killed my 5-year-old), expulsed (e.g. I am no longer a victim of 
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anger) or can never be associated (e.g. I am not my abuser and I am not God) (Example 6 
Figure 1)? Can the conscious decision to dis-associate and never-associate allow those 
category labels to function in ways comparable to those category labels that become an I/me-
self? If so, is there any value to extend the territory of traditional self-schema research into 
one that includes them?  
 
It is possible that not all such category labels are of relevance. For example, once a mother 
recognizes that she is no longer a victim of anger, that I-self or me-self is probably best to be 
deleted from memory, never to surface again. No further bottom-up or top-down processes 
should be wasted on further processing of that sense of self. But there might be other 
category labels that even though people know they are singularly unhelpful, they just cannot 
leave them out of their memory (e.g. I can never be someone who drives that kind of car). 
But there must be ways that the processing capacity wasted on it can be reduced to minimum.  
 
Finally, there may be dissociation and never-association labels that can help increase 
psychological well-being. “I am not my abuser” gives the individual confirmation that they 
have won the most significant battle in how they could define their lives: not becoming their 
abuser! Is it possible that a confirmation of what they are not is as significant (if not more 
significant) as a confirmation of who they are (e.g. a good mother)? Is it possible that our 
understanding of the self should include both how people define who they are and how 
people set boundaries as to who they are not? Can these two ways of defining the self provide 
different functional advantages when it comes to growing psychological well-being? If so, 
what kind of framework would allow us to understand them? What if we introduce the 
following:  
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Not-I-self refers to the selves in which the adoption of category labels is consciously 
rejected on a temporary or permanent basis. 
 
 Not-Me-self refers to the selves in which the adoption of category labels is 
unconsciously rejected on a temporary or permanent basis.  
 
What makes these category labels part of our sense of self is the reality that these rejected 
category labels can shape our sense of who we are in ways similar to our I/me-selves. They 
do so through the same processes like adoption, definition and reinforcement. It may however 
be necessary to assign a different territory of the self for the existence and the management of 
these selves. We propose to term that space the United Self. 
 
The United Self is the self that consciously manages the paradox existing between self-
associated and not-self-associated category labels that operate in mutually opposing 
ways.  
 
Due to space constraints I will not go into detail about whether there is evidence to show that 
these distinctive components of the self exist or why they must be labelled and defined 
separately. Nor is there space to explore why we cannot simply call them something that the 
I/me-self can handle (e.g. the rejected self), or explain why they cannot exist as continuums 
of the I/me-selves. Details on that can be found in Shang (2019). I will only moot the 
potential benefits of studying these components of the self for fundraisers. 
 
How can Not-I-Self, Not-Me-Self and United Self help fundraisers? 
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It can be helpful for fundraisers to know that I/me-self and Not-I/me-self, although opposites 
in labels, are not necessarily opposites in definitions. For example, I/me-Self can have one 
label (e.g. an angry mother) and one definition (e.g. a victim of my anger). The Not-I/me-self 
however can refer to anything as long as it is not an angry mother defined as a victim of her 
anger. Not-I/me-self may even have no definition at all. This could be because a definition is 
not possible (e.g. what does “I am not God” mean?), the attempts to define them  are too 
painful (e.g. what does it mean to be an abuser, so that you can say you are not an abuser?), 
or it is simply complicated and takes a lot of processing capacity to accomplish (e.g.  I am not 
an angry mother can mean that I am a conqueror of anger, tolerant of anger or some 
combination of both).  
 
It is my hypothesis that the level of complexity inherent in the definition of the Not-I/me 
labels is almost always greater than in the definitions of the I/me-labels. Realizing this allows 
fundraisers to recognize the challenge they may face if they must work with such aspects of 
self. For example, the Heritage Foundation’s mission is to “formulate and promote 
conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, 
individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defence” (The 
Heritage Foundation, n.d).  
 
Supporters of the Heritage Foundation may define themselves as a republican or as Not-
liberal or Not-democrat. Those defining themselves as a republican may be more receptive to 
fundraising messages that are designed to strengthen their conservative values than those 
defining themselves as a Not-democrat. This is because a republican I-self is more clearly 
defined and can be precisely elevated by what the Heritage Foundation does. Whereas a Not-
democrat may have multiple meanings (one of which could be that I am simply angry with 
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the democrats at the moment). Giving by the Not-democrats may thus be motivated by a 
more complex array of reasons than giving by republicans. I think fundraising 
communications can be designed more effectively if fundraisers can detect the most 
appropriate category label that their supporters accepted as well as rejected, and assess which 
ones are more important to them and more relevant to the decisions at hand.  
 
Recognizing that people’s sense of self may be defined by opposing selves is also important, 
because people do attempt to create a more harmonious unity in their united self.  Here, 
fundraisers can apply the identity relevance principle to tap into the harmonious existence 
that unites people’s opposing selves. Amnesty International, for example is “the world's 
leading human rights organisation, campaigning against injustice and inequality everywhere” 
(Amnesty Internation, n.d). Their supporters can define themselves both as someone who 
does Not-tolerate-human-rights-abuse and someone who feels for the family and friends of 
those whose human rights are abused.  
 
The loving-self they have for those who suffer may engender a tender caring tendency in 
their behaviour, while the No-tolerance-to-abuse-self they have for the abuser may endanger 
a fighting spirit in guiding their behaviour. The balance between the two may best 
characterize who a mature Amnesty supporter is. My hypothesis is that fundraising 
communications can be more effective if fundraisers can characterise all relevant selves that 
include both their supporters’ I-selves and their Not-I-selves rather than only a subset of 
them. 
 
It is also possible that fundraising messages tapping into how the united-self strikes a 
harmonious balance in defining who the supporter is and how their holistic sense of who they 
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are determines what they do for Amnesty, would be more effective than those that touch on 
all the separate components in isolation. A balanced fundraising message that acknowledges 
the two for example could read: “The fight will be long and daunting, but for the sake of 
those imprisoned we have to say no to human rights abuse until it finally comes to an end.” 
The first half of this message touches the loving-self and the second half touches the No-
tolerance self. And the harmony the united self drives is one in which Amnesty supporters 
fight for as long as necessary to care for (and express their love for) the abused. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I explained how the I/me selves and meta-self can help raise more sustainable 
charitable income and grow donors’ psychological well-being. I also mooted the possibility 
of exploring the Not-I/me selves and the united self and hypothesized what their potential 
value may be in reaching the same goals. The successful application of much what I suggest 
in this chapter is contingent on fundraisers’ ability to understand their donors in a deep level 
and in real time. Without the digital revolution, these ideas would be difficult to 
operationalize and implement, but as organizations increasingly interact with donors in real-
time, the ability to hyper-personalize communication is now a reality. Nonprofits now have a 
significant and meaningful opportunity to enhance the quality of the donor experience and 
grow both individual giving and personal wellbeing as a consequence.  
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United-Self’s unique territory 
(Extention of Self-Schemas) 
Meta-Self’s territory Territory of Traditional Self-Schemas 
Environmental Inputs 
 
 
 Adoption Me-Self I-Self Not-I and Not-me Selves 
  Unconscious 
Self-
Association 
to  
Conscious Self-Association to Conscious dissociation or 
never-association to 
 Definition other defined 
category 
labels 
 Other-defined category 
labels 
Self-defined category labels Any category labels 
    by using the 
same label 
by using a 
different 
label 
by using the 
same label 
by using a 
different 
label 
Or any definitions 
Example (1) An angry 
mother who is 
a victim of her 
own anger 
(2) An angry 
mother 
which means 
a victim of 
her own 
anger 
(3) A MADD 
supporter 
which means 
a victim of 
her own 
anger 
(4) An angry 
mother which 
means a 
conqueror of 
her own anger 
(5) A MADD 
supporter 
which means 
a conqueror 
of her own 
anger 
(6) I am no longer a victim of 
my own anger; I can never be 
someone who buys that kind 
of car; I am not my abuser 
and I am not God. 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Reinforcement of isolated selves                 Dilution of isolated selves 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Elevation of interconnected selves                Suppression of  
                       Interconnected selves 
Self-Schemas 
(Including both the traditional territory and United Self’s uniquely extended territory) 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(-) 
(-) 
(+)          Adoption 
